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RETROACTIVITY OF NEW RULES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE
OVERTURNED WARREN SUMMERLIN'S
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEATH SENTENCE
Sarah R. Greene*
"He who the sword of heaven will bear should be as holy as severe."1
INTRODUCTION
Warren Summerlin's conviction for first-degree murder and sexual assault, and
his resulting death sentence are, in the words of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, "raw material from which legal fiction is forged."2 Indeed,
Summerlin suffered an inordinate number of bizarre misfortunes from the beginning
of his journey through the criminal justice system.3 Court-ordered psychiatric
evaluations revealed disturbing mental impairments, but still found Summerlin
competent to stand trial and ostensibly legally sane.4 His first lawyer initially worked
out a favorable plea agreement, from which Summerlin ultimately withdrew after
* Sarah R. Greene is a JD candidate at the College of William & Mary School of Law.
She graduated from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill with a bachelor of arts
in English. She wishes to thank her parents for their unwavering support and Brendan H.
Chandonnet for his invaluable guidance during the note-writing process.
' Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926, 948 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting WTLI[AM
SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FORMEASURE act 3, sc. 2) (discussing possible judicial impairment
at Warren Summerlin's trial due to use of marijuana), withdrawn, 281 F.3d 836 (9th Cir.
2002) (deferring submission pending the final disposition by the Supreme Court in State v.
Ring, 25 P.3d 1139 (Ariz. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)).
2 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), rev'd sub nom.
Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
3 For a more detailed account of the facts surrounding Summerlin's conviction and
sentence see discussion infra Part II.A.
' One doctor explained that Summerlin's dyslexia and illiteracy made him "functionally
mentally retarded"; that "Summerlin's impulse control was extremely impaired due to an
explosive-type personality disorder[;] and that he had an anti-social personality." Summerlin,
267 F.3d at 942 (recounting the observations of Dr. Maier Tuchler). Another doctor
suspected that Summerlin suffered from psychomotor epilepsy because Summerlin described
"experiencing an intense perfume odor" when he committed the murder. Id. (recounting the
observations of Dr. Leonardo Garcia-Bunuel). Still another doctor found "indications of
organic brain impairment, borderline personality disorder, and paranoid personality disorder."
Id. (noting the observations of Dr. Donald Tatro).
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the judge cautioned that he would not honor the sentencing recommendation.5
Unbeknownst to Summerlin, after the judge's warning but before Summerlin
withdrew his plea, his lawyer and the prosecutor who negotiated the plea
agreement had a romantic encounter after a Christmas party.6 Following a brief jury
trial, Judge Philip Marquardt alone was responsible for meting out Summerlin's
punishment.' After a Friday penalty-phase hearing Judge Marquardt sentenced
Summerlin to death the following Monday.' Again, unbeknownst to Summerlin, the
judge who decided his fate "behind closed doors over the weekend" suffered from
a marijuana addiction. 9 If only Summerlin had been sentenced twenty years later,
constitutional law would have required that his fate rest in the hands of a group of
jurors, rather than a single judge who may have been high.'°
On June 24, 2002, in the landmark decision of Ring v. Arizona, the United
States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Arizona capital sentencing
scheme that allowed a judge, sitting alone, to determine the presence or absence of
aggravating factors required for imposition of the death penalty." The petitioner,
Timothy Ring, was convicted by a jury of "felony murder occurring in the course
of armed robbery."'12 Pursuant to the Arizona statute then in effect,' 3 the trial judge
held a separate sentencing hearing after the guilt phase of the trial: he found two
aggravating factors, no mitigating circumstances sufficient to call for leniency, and
accordingly sentenced Ring to death.' 4 Because the jury verdict alone would have
conferred a maximum punishment of life imprisonment, the Supreme Court found
thatjudge-only determination of aggravating factors violated the Sixth Amendment
jury trial guarantee. 5 Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that "[c]apital
defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the
legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment."' 6
Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1087.
6 Id. at 1086-87.
7 Id. at 1088-90.
Id. at 1090.
O Summerlin, 267 F.3d at 953.
0 The Ninth Circuit concluded that while "[t]he amount of marijuana that Judge
Marquardt may have used during the trial or deliberations is unknown, .... there is record
support for Summerlin' s claim that Judge Marquardt was either having difficulty concentrat-
ing or experiencing short-term memory loss." Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1090. Observing that
although Judge Marquardt "exhibited confusion over facts that had just been presented to
him" and that he "made some quite perplexing, if not unintelligible, statements at various
times during the trial[,]" the question of Marquardt's impairment would remain unresolved
in the absence of discovery or an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1090 n.2.
' Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
12 Id. at 591.
3 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (West 2001).
"' Ring, 536 U.S. at 594-95.
'I Id. at 597, 609.
6 d. at 589.
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Far from settling uncertainty in death penalty jurisprudence, the Ring opinion
generated new problems for states that do not require juries to impose the death
penalty. Ring invalidated not only Arizona's sentencing scheme, but similar
procedures followed by Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska. 7 Ring also cast
doubt on procedures followed in Alabama, Florida, Delaware, and Indiana where the
death penalty is imposed pursuant to an advisory scheme, giving roles to both judges
and juries.I" Most of these states changed their sentencing procedures in attempt to
satisfy Ring, 9 but there is still some debate as to exactly which sentencing schemes
will satisfy Ring.2° For instance, under the advisory schemes still followed in
Alabama and Florida, juries make factual findings and recommend sentences to the
judge, who then makes the final sentencing determination.2' Do these statutes
satisfy Ring?
22
'" Holly Shaver Bryant, Capital Punishment/The Death Penalty: Trends in 2002, 2002
NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. 4 (on file with author).
18 See id
'9 The Death Penalty in 2002: Year End Report, 2002 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 3,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/yrendrpt02.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2004) [hereinafter
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.]:
Montana and Indiana changed their laws in anticipation of the Court's
ruling. Delaware, Colorado, Nevada, Nebraska[,] and Arizona revised
their laws after the Court's Ring decision. Idaho acknowledged the
need for similar action on its statute. At least one federal case has been
remanded to the lower courts in light of the Ring ruling, and federal
prosecutors are altering their procedures in the hope of avoiding
legislative change. So far, Florida and Alabama, which allow judges to
override jury recommendations in capital cases, have resisted any
changes to their laws.
Id.
20 E.g., Nathan A. Forrester, Judge Versus Jury: The Continuing Validity of Alabama's
Capital Sentencing Regime After Ring v. Arizona, 54 ALA. L. REv. 1157, 1158 (2003)
(observing that Ring "left open the question whether judicial override schemes such as
Alabama's complied with the Sixth Amendment"); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate
Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role of the Jury in Capital Sentencing,
54 ALA. L. REv. 1091, 1094-95 (2003) ("The Ring decision does not resolve how broad a
role the jury must play in the capital sentencing process.... At the very least, Ring's express
overruling of Walton calls into question - and justifies a revisiting of- a quarter-century
of jurisprudence on the role of the jury in capital sentencing."); Eric J. Beane, Case Note,
When it Comes to Capital Sentencing, You Be the Judge: Ring v. Arizona, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
225, 230 (2003) ("Ring's silence on the issue of retroactivity creates a new problem of
constitutional uncertainty."); Casey Laffey, Note, The Death Penalty and the Sixth
Amendment: How Will the System Look After Ring v. Arizona?, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 371,
382 (2003) ("Although the decision in Ring resolved the constitutionality of Arizona's death
penalty system, it created many more questions regarding capital sentencing systems in other
states around the country."); DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 19.
21 Bryant, supra note 17.
22 See Forrester, supra note 20, at 1157, for a possible answer with respect to Alabama.
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Another major question left unanswered by Ring, and the focus of this Note, is
whether death row inmates, who have exhausted their direct appeals and were
sentenced under schemes like the procedure invalidated by Ring, may obtain the
benefit of Ring's holding when seeking federal habeas corpus relief. In Summerlin
v. Stewart, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit answered this
question in Warren Summerlin's favor, holding that federal habeas petitioners who
were sentenced to death by judges sitting alone may obtain the benefit of the rule
announced in Ring v. Arizona.23 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit directly contra-
dicted the conclusion of the Eleventh Circuit in Turner v. Crosby24 and contradicted
the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Cannon v. Mullin.22 In holding that a new
constitutional rule may apply to sentences thought to be final, the Ninth Circuit
called into question the constitutionality of eighty-nine death sentences in Arizona,26
fifteen in Idaho,27 and five in Montana.28
Undoubtedly because of the circuit split created by the Sumerlin decision, and
the number of lives at stake, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve two
questions:
1. Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the new rule
announced in Ring is substantive, rather than procedural, and
therefore exempt from the retroactivity analysis of Teague v.
Lane... ? [and]
2. Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the new rule
announced in Ring applies retroactively to case's [sic] on
collateral review under Teague's exception for watershed rules
of criminal procedure that alter bedrock procedural principles
and seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceedings?
29
23 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Schriro
v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
24 Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247 (1 lth Cir. 2003) (declining to give a habeas petitioner
the benefit of the new rule announced by Ring), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2104 (2004).
25 Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2002) (denying retroactive application of
Ring). A different retroactivity analysis applied to Cannon's habeas petition, and therefore
the Tenth Circuit's holding was not necessarily irreconcilable with the Ninth Circuit's
Summerlin holding. See discussion infra Part II.C.
26 Steve Mills, Federal Court Voids 100 Death Sentences; Inmates in West Given
Rehearings, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WL 63025975.
27 Id.
28 Anne Gearan, Justices Take on Death Penalty Morass, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Dec. 2, 2003, at 2A, available at 2003 WL 58675806.
29 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Summerlin (No. 03-526) (citations omitted);
Summerlin, 341 F.3d 1082, cert. granted sub nom. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 834 (granting
certiorari "limited to Questions I and 2 presented by the petition").
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In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, the Supreme Court held that Ring
announced neither a substantive rule,3 nor a watershed rule of criminal procedure.3'
Accordingly, Ring does not apply retroactively to cases that were final before its
decision was announced.
This Note provides a more in-depth analysis of the issues the Supreme Court
faced in resolving the retroactivity question than did the Schriro v. Summerlin
opinion. This analysis shows that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's holding to
the contrary, the Ninth Circuit was correct in concluding that the rule announced by
Ring should be applied retroactively to federal habeas petitioners. Part I summarizes
the major decisions leading up to Summerlin, both within death penalty
jurisprudence and retroactivityjurisprudence. Part II examines the reasoning behind
the Ninth Circuit's Summerlin holding and provides a more detailed account of the
facts surrounding Warren Summerlin's conviction and sentencing. Part II also
explains the reasoning used by the Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits to reach conclusions contrary to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Summerlin.
Finally, Part III identifies additional arguments that support the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that Ring should be applied retroactively, but that were not incorporated
in the Summerlin v. Stewart opinion.
That the Ninth Circuit followed existing precedent and sound logic in reaching
its conclusion in Summerlin will be evident from the following discussion of death
penalty and retroactivity jurisprudence, and the explication of the Ninth Circuit
opinion. Furthermore, an examination of the circuit split precipitated by Summerlin
will reveal that the Ninth Circuit's logic is the most persuasive among those circuits
that weighed in on the Ring retroactivity question prior to the Supreme Court's
decision; and indeed" its logic is even more persuasive than that of the Supreme
Court's majority. Finally, after taking into account the concerns of fairness in the
administration of the death penalty, especially given the singular circumstances of
Summerlin's conviction and sentencing, it will be clear that the Supreme Court
should have affirmed the Ninth Circuit's withdrawal of Summerlin's
unconstitutional death sentence.
31 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2523 (2004).
3" Id. at 2524-25.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Arizona Death Penalty Jurisprudence
Landmark decisions by the United States Supreme Court have forced the
revision of Arizona's capital sentencing scheme several times over the past thirty
years, beginning with the 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia.32 From 1919 until
1972, Arizona left the decision to impose a death sentence completely within the
discretion of a jury.33 Because Furman held that death penalty statutes conferring
complete discretion in sentencing on judges or juries were unconstitutional,34
Arizona revised its death penalty statute in 1973 to require sentencing by judges
rather than juries in capital cases.35
Arizona's death penalty faced its next major constitutional challenge in 1990.36
Following a jury's conviction of Jeffrey Walton for first-degree murder, the trial
court held a separate sentencing hearing as required by Arizona statute. 37 At the
State's behest, the trial court found two aggravating circumstances: "(1) The murder
was committed 'in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner,"'' 38 and "(2)
the murder was committed for pecuniary gain."39 Walton presented mitigating
testimony from "a psychiatrist who opined that Walton had a long history of
substance abuse which impaired his judgment.... and that Walton may have been
abused sexually as a child." 40 The court sentenced Walton to death, "conclud[ing]
32 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
33 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1102 (recounting the history of Arizona's death penalty
statute).
14 Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (The Court criticized "a system of law and of justice that
leaves to the uncontrolled discretion ofjudges orjuries the determination whether defendants
committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned.... People live or die, dependent on
the whim of one man or of 12."); Forrester, supra note 20, at 1157 ("Furman targeted jury
discretion as the chief defect of modem capital sentencing, because of the opportunity it
afforded for capricious imposition of the death penalty.").
35 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1103 (citing Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 138, § 5, 1973 Ariz.
Sess. Laws 966, 968-70).
36 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
37 Id. at 645 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (West 1989)). After a defendant
was fo.und guilty of first-degree murder, the statute directed the court to hold a sentencing
hearing, without a jury, to decide whether to impose a sentence of death or life
imprisonment. The judge had to determine the existence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances enumerated in the statute. If the court found one or more of the aggravating
circumstances and "no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency,"
it was directed to impose a death sentence. Id. at 643-44.
38 Id. at 645 (citing § 13-703(F)(6)).
9 Id. (citing § 13-703(F)(5)).
40 Id. (citing § 13-703(G)(1)).
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that there were 'no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency.'. 4
The Supreme Court rejected Walton's argument that his sentence violated the
Sixth Amendment, and thus upheld the Arizona capital sentencing scheme.42
Reasoning that the aggravating factors that must be found prior to imposition of the
death penalty were sentencing considerations, and not elements of a distinct offense
of capital murder, the Court concluded that they did not have to be submitted to a
jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.43 Only ten years after this decision, the
Supreme Court cast serious doubt on the Walton rationale when it decided Apprendi
v. New Jersey.44
Although not a capital case, Apprendi directly contradicted the logic of Walton,
thereby calling into question the constitutionality of Arizona's death penalty once
again.45 Apprendi invalidated a New Jersey hate crime statute that allowed ajudge
to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum allowed by the jury's verdict
if he found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's purpose in
committing the crime was to intimidate the victim based on a particular characteris-
tic of the victim.' Grounding its decision in the Due Process Clause and the Sixth
Amendment jury trial guarantee, the Apprendi Court held that "[o]ther than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
47
41 Id. (citing § 13-703).
42 Walton, 497 U.S. at 649.
41 Id. at 647. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had recently
reached the opposite conclusion in Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988),
finding that the aggravating factors required to impose the death penalty were elements of
a distinct offense of capital murder. Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment required that the
elements be submitted and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. When the Arizona
Supreme Court upheld Walton's sentence, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve the split. Id.
" 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
41 See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
46 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491. Charles Apprendi entered into a plea agreement pursuant
to which the State reserved the right to request that the court impose an enhanced sentence
as provided for in its hate crime statute. The judge accepted Apprendi's guilty pleas, and
subsequently the prosecutor filed a motion for an enhanced sentence. After an evidentiary
hearing on Apprendi's purpose, the judge imposed an enhanced sentence, finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that Apprendi fired into the home of an African-American
family with a purpose to intimidate. Id. at 470-7 1.
47 Id. at 490. The result in Apprendi was the natural extension of Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227 (1999), which examined a federal statute, to a state statute. In Jones the
Supreme Court observed that "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an
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The Apprendi Court's conclusion could not coexist with Walton, 8 and
accordingly, the Supreme Court revisited Arizona's capital sentencing scheme in
2002. 4 9 In Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court was confronted with facts and a
constitutional challenge virtually identical to those presented by Walton, but in light
of the Apprendi holding, the Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion. 5 The
Court recognized that "Apprendi's reasoning [was] irreconcilable with Walton's
holding," and explicitly "overrule[d] Walton in relevant part."'" Accordingly, the
Court held that "[c]apital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants ... are
entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an
increase in their maximum punishment."52
B. History of Retroactivity Jurisprudence
When Ring v. Arizona held that juries must decide the presence or absence of
aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances before imposition of the death
penalty, the Supreme Court announced a "new constitutional rule of criminal
procedure" within the meaning of Teague v. Lane.53 In addressing Ring's Sixth
Amendment claim, however, the Court left an important question unanswered: do
the death row inmates who were sentenced under Arizona's unconstitutional capital
punishment scheme benefit from the new rule announced in Ring? Retroactivity
jurisprudence clearly answers that question in the affirmative for those inmates who
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Jones, 526 U.S.
at 243 n.6. The Apprendi Court adopted Justice Stevens's observation that "it is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase
the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear
that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 490 (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
41 Justice O'Connor immediately recognized the conflict, observing in her Apprendi
dissent that "[i]f the Court does not intend to overrule Walton, one would be hard pressed to
tell from the opinion it issues today." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 538 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
41 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
" Ring was convicted of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. As in
Walton, the judge, sitting without a jury, sentenced Ring to death after finding two
aggravating factors and no mitigating circumstances sufficient to call for leniency. Ring
argued on appeal that his sentence violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at
594-95.
1' Id. at 589.
52 Id.
" Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989) (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court
announces a "new rule" for purposes of the Teague analysis when "it breaks new ground or
imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.... To put it differently,
a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became final." Id. at 301 (citations omitted).
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did not exhaust their direct appeals before the opinion was issued,54 but Ring's
impact on inmates seeking collateral relief is less clear.
The Supreme Court's preeminent opinion on retroactive application of new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure, Teague v. Lane, provides a framework for
this determination but does not provide a clear answer to the question left open by
Ring.5 Justice O'Connor authored the opinion of a divided Supreme Court in
Teague v. Lane, which came under fire in subsequent Supreme Court opinions
beginning in the year it was decided. 6 Even today "[tihe Justices continue to differ
over the import and application of fundamental components of the doctrine."57
The Teague analysis had its genesis in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Mackey v. United States,58 which the Supreme Court expressly adopted and
expanded in Teague.59 Harlan distinguished cases on direct review from cases on
collateral review, and concluded that new rules of constitutional law should
always be applied on direct review.6' For cases on collateral review, however, "he
concluded that it was better policy to apply the law prevailing at the time of the
conviction rather than the new law prevailing at the time of the petition."' 1 The
"policy" implicated by retroactive application of new constitutional rules included
several justifications for the presumption against retroactivity: that the purpose of
habeas corpus to "ensure[] that constitutional standards are honored," is fulfilled
as long as "the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original
proceedings took place" are applied; 62 that "retroactive application of new rules
frustrates the judicial need for comity and finality";63 and that weighing "the relative
costs and benefits of retroactivity generally shows that 'costs imposed upon the
State[s] ... generally far outweigh the benefits. ' ' 6'
" Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) ("[A] new rule for the conduct of
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on
direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes
a 'clear break' with the past.").
Teague, 489 U.S. 288.
56 Id. at 289. Parts IV and V of the Teague opinion adopt the modem approach to
retroactivity of new constitutional rules to cases on collateral review. Only three other
Justices joined Justice O'Connor in these Parts: Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia
and Kennedy. Id.
17 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 25.1, at 1028 (4th ed. 2001).
58 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
9 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-13; Laffey, supra note 20, at 392-93.
6o Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,679-85 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
(" Laffey, supra note 20, at 393 (citations omitted).
62 Beane, supra note 20, at 233 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 306).
63 Id. (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 308).
64 Id. (citing Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring)
(alterations in original)).
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Since the Supreme Court adopted Justice Harlan's Mackey rationale in Teague
v. Lane, federal habeas petitions have been evaluated under the presumption that
"new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those
cases which have become final before the new rules are announced." 65  The
Supreme Court delineated two exceptions to the presumption of non-retroactivity.
The first exception applies where the new rule "places 'certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
to proscribe."" The second exception allows for retroactive application of a new
rule "if it requires the observance of 'those procedures that... are implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. "67
A reading of Teague alone, however, would not necessarily dictate its
application to Summerlin's petition. The Supreme Court declined to address
application of the Teague framework to capital sentencing in the Teague opinion
itself;68 however, it later held that the Teague rule of non-retroactivity, and its two
exceptions, did apply to review of death sentences. 69 Accordingly, the presumptive
65 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. Although Teague governs questions of retroactivity in the
federal habeas context, note however, that "[in state postconviction proceedings, this issue
is generally governed by state law rules of retroactivity." Stevenson, supra note 20, at 1095
n.26. The scope of this Note is limited to the federal habeas context.
66 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)). Harlan identified several examples of cases that would fall
within the first exception to the non-retroactivity rule: Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969) (speaking ill of the American flag); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (private
possession of obscene material); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of birth
control); and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriages). Id.
67 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quotations omitted). Harlan pointed to the recognition of the
right to counsel at trial for serious crimes in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), as
an example of a rule that should be applied retroactively on collateral review. Mackey, 401
U.S. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68 A footnote to a section of Justice O'Connor's opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined, explicitly declined to "express any views
as to how the retroactivity approach we adopt today is to be applied in the capital sentencing
context." Teague, 489 U.S. at 314 n.2. However, the four Justices declined to adopt "Justice
Stevens's suggestion that the finality concerns underlying Justice Harlan's approach to
retroactivity are limited to 'making convictions final,' and are therefore 'wholly inapplicable
to the capital sentencing context."' Id. (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 321 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
69 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,303 (1989) ("The Teague rule of nonretroactivity and
its two exceptions are applicable in the capital sentencing context."), overruled by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (overruling Penry's primary holding that execution of
mentally retarded prisoners did not violate the Eighth Amendment, but leaving undisturbed
the secondary holding that the Teague retroactivity analysis applies to capital sentences).
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rule of non-retroactivity and its two exceptions were applied by both the Supreme
Court70 and the Ninth Circuit7 ' in evaluating Summerlin's habeas petition.
The foregoing history of death penalty and retroactivity jurisprudence is the
legal backdrop against which the Ninth Circuit evaluated Summerlin's habeas
petition. While much of the Ninth Circuit opinion is devoted to arguments based
on Ring v. Arizona and Teague v. Lane, the majority went into considerable detail
in recounting the facts surrounding Summerlin's conviction and sentencing.72
Accordingly, because the majority's emphasis on the facts suggests they may have
influenced its conclusion, the crucial ones are reproduced in the section that follows.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Facts Surrounding Summerlin's Conviction and Sentencing
The Ninth Circuit described the facts surrounding Warren Summerlin's
conviction for the first-degree murder and sexual assault of Brenna Bailey as "raw
material from which legal fiction is forged."7 3 Summerlin's first lawyer helped him
to negotiate a favorable plea agreement under which he would plead guilty to the
second-degree murder of Bailey, to aggravated assault in an unrelated road rage
incident, and to violating his probation in another case charging burglary. 74 In
exchange, Summerlin would serve concurrent sentences, with the longest being
twenty-one years for Bailey's murder.75 After Summerlin entered his plea on
December 15, 1981, Judge Derickson informed him that he did not intend to accept
the stipulated sentence and that if Summerlin wanted his plea to stand, he would
face up to thirty-eight-and-one-half years in prison.76 At the next hearing before
Judge Derickson on December 22, 1981, Summerlin elected to withdraw from his
plea agreement, which made him eligible for a first-degree murder conviction and
a death sentence.77
70 See Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2522-23 (2004).
71 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1108-21.
72 Id. at 1084-92.
71 Id. at 1084.
71 Id. at 1086. The significance of this road rage incident is that it led to Summerlin's
conviction for aggravated assault, which later served as one of the two statutory aggravating
factors that made him eligible for the death penalty. Id. at 1084-90. This conviction
stemmed from Summerlin's actions after "a car veered off the road, jumped the curb and
struck Summerlin's wife, who was hospitalized for her injuries. At the scene, Summerlin
brandished a pocket knife at the errant driver, an act that occasioned the filing of the criminal
assault charge." Id. at 1084.
71 Id. at 1086.
76 Id. at 1087.
77 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1087.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Meanwhile, unbeknownst to Summerlin, his counsel developed a personal
conflict of interest between the December 15 and December 22 hearings when she
attended a Christmas party on the evening of December 18, 1981.
She [Summerlin's counsel] and prosecutor Doe left the party
together and had what she later described as a "personal
involvement ... of a romantic nature." As a result of that, as she
later testified, she felt she "could no longer ethically represent
Mr. Summerlin." Because of the circumstances, she believed
"that it would be appropriate for another Public Defender to
handle the case and take it to trial ....
Despite her misgivings, Summerlin's counsel never reported the conflict to
Summerlin or to the court and she continued to represent him at the December 22
hearing.8" Summerlin was eventually assigned new counsel, but only after he
expressed dissatisfaction with his representation for reasons other than the
undisclosed encounter between his lawyer and the prosecutor. 8'
Sunmerlin's murder trial was subsequently assigned to Judge Philip Marquardt
who, it was later discovered, came with his own sort of conflict.82 The trial itself
lasted only four days, and the jury took only three hours to find Summerlin guilty
of both first-degree murder and sexual assault.83 The sentencing hearing was
similarly perfunctory, requiring only twenty-six transcript pages.' In support of its
aggravation argument, the State presented only one exhibit: the documents related
to Summerlin's aggravated assault conviction for the road rage incident.8" In
mitigation, the defense presented the written report of Dr. Tatro. 86 Judge Marquardt
said he would deliberate over the weekend and pronounce a sentence the following
Monday.87
When the sentencing hearing resumed, Judge Marquardt announced that he
found "two aggravating circumstances and no sufficiently substantial mitigating
circumstances. 88 In aggravation he found "that the defendant had a prior felony
78 Id. at 1086-88.
71 Id. at 1086-87.
80 Id. at 1087.
8' Id. at 1087-88.
82 Id. at 1089 (discussing Marquardt's marijuana use).
83 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1088.
84 Id. at 1089.
85 id.
8 Id. Although Summerlin's counsel had planned to call Dr. Tatro as a witness at the
sentencing hearing, Sunmerlin objected to allowing him to testify as a live witness. Id.
97 id.
88 Id. at 1090.
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conviction involving the use or threatened use of violence on another person, '89 and
that "Summerlin committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved
manner."9 Accordingly, he sentenced Summerlin to death.
Though Summerlin and his counsel were not aware of it at the time, Judge
Marquardt had a problem with marijuana addiction when he sentenced Summerlin
to death.9 After Marquardt was charged with a second marijuana-related offense
in 1991, he "stepped down from the bench and was ordered disbarred in Arizona and
by the United States Supreme Court. '92 Marquardt subsequently admitted to using
marijuana regularly in the years in which he sentenced both Summerlin and another
death row inmate challenging his sentence.93 When asked about one death sentence
that he gave, Marquardt admitted that he did not remember the man, "but he said he
had no doubt that the death penalty was warranted. 'These guys have sentenced
themselves,"' he remarked."
Although the missteps of Summerlin's first counsel and Judge Marquardt are
reprehensible, considerations of fairness alone are not sufficient to surmount the
hurdles to retroactive application of a new rule. No doubt influenced by
Summerlin's misfortunes, the Ninth Circuit cleared these hurdles by following the
complicated retroactivity jurisprudence crafted by the Supreme Court.95 In
concluding that Ring is either a substantive rule that is presumptively retroactive, or,
in the alternative, that it falls within a Teague exception that allows for its
retroactive application, the Ninth Circuit reached a result that is both just and
grounded in constitutional law. These arguments are explained in the following
section.
" Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1090 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(F)(2) (1981)
(amended in 1993)).
9 Id. (citing § 13-703(F)(6)).
9' id. at 1089.
92 id. at 1090 n. 1.
9' Adam Liptak, Issue in 2 Death Sentences: Judge's Drug Use, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
2002, reprinted in CHI. D. L. BULL. 1., May 16, 2002, at 1.
94 Id.
9' The Summerlin majority explicitly linked their concerns with Marquardt' s behavior to
a key portion of the Teague retroactivity analysis that required examining whether changes
mandated by Ring seriously enhanced the accuracy of capital sentencing proceedings:
[T]he extremity of [Marquardt's] actions highlights the potential risk
of accuracy loss when a capital decision is reposed in a single decision-
maker who may be habituated to the process, or who may not treat
capital sentencing in accordance with the heightened requirements that
the Eighth Amendment imposes. Obviously, in Summerlin's case, the
concern is not merely theoretical.
Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1114-15. See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text for an
explanation of how Ring's jury requirement enhances accuracy in sentencing proceedings.
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B. Reasoning of the Ninth Circuit Summerlin Opinion
The Ninth Circuit Summerlin majority took a two-pronged approach in
concluding that Ring should apply retroactively to Summerlin's habeas petition.
In the first instance, the court of appeals posited that the rule announced in Ring
was not subject to a Teague analysis because the new rule was one of substance
rather than procedure.96 The classification of Ring's rule as substantive dictates its
retroactive application because "[uinlike strictly procedural rules, 'new rules of
substantive criminal law are presumptively retroactive.' ' '97 In the alternative, the
Ninth Circuit evaluated the procedural aspects of the new rule within the Teague
framework and held that retroactive application was mandated because it fell within
the second Teague exception to the presumption against non-retroactivity.9 8
1. The Teague Presumption Against Non-Retroactivity Did Not Apply Because
Ring Announced a New Substantive Rule.
The Ninth Circuit began the first prong of its retroactivity analysis by observing
that "[tihe threshold question in a Teague analysis is whether the rule the petitioner
96 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1108.
7 Id. at 1099 (citing Santana-Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001)).
9 The Supreme Court condensed the Ninth Circuit's analysis from three steps to two.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis consisted of (1) a threshold inquiry of whether a Teague analysis
applied to the new rule; (2) determining that if a Teague analysis did apply to the procedural
aspects of the new rule, the new rule did not fit within the first Teague exception; (3) but that
Ring did fall within the second Teague exception to the presumptive non-retroactivity of
procedural rules. The Supreme Court combined the threshold determination of whether Ring
announced a new procedural rule with its evaluation of what the Ninth Circuit considered the
first Teague exception, see Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2523-24 (2004), which,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned, applies where "certain primary conduct has been decriminalized
or [where] certain classes of individuals are immunized from specified forms of punishment
by the newly announced rule," 341 F.3d at 1109 (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484
(1990)). The Supreme Court began its analysis with the prerise that "[n]ew substantive rules
generally apply retroactively. This includes decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal
statute by interpreting its terms," 124 S. Ct. at 2522 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998)), "as well as constitutional determinations that place particular
conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State's power to punish," id. (citing
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)
(plurality opinion)). Perhaps in an attempt to prevent confusion, the Supreme Court appended
a footnote explaining that although it "sometimes referred to rules of this latter type as falling
under an exception to Teague's bar on retroactive application of procedural rules; they are
more accurately characterized as substantive rules not subject to the bar." Id. at n.4 (citations
omitted). The Supreme Court's truncated analysis probably deserved a more thorough
explanation than the footnote provided, given that the Ninth Circuit concluded that Ring
was a substantive rule not subject to the Teague bar, 341 F.3d at 1099-1108, while
simultaneously rejecting the notion that it fell within the first Teague exception, id. at 1109.
Obviously, under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, these inquiries were distinct.
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seeks to apply is a substantive rule or a procedural rule, because 'Teague by its
terms only applies [sic] to procedural rules.' 99 The significance of this distinction
is that "the Teague retroactivity bar does not apply if the rule Ring announced is
substantive, rather than procedural, in nature."' ° The Ninth Circuit interpreted the
substantive-procedural distinction in the Teague context as follows: "a new rule is
one of 'procedure' if it impacts the operation of the criminal trial process, and a new
rule is one of 'substance' if it alters the scope or modifies the applicability of a
substantive criminal statute."'' °
While both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit invoked Bousley v. United
States '2 to determine whether Ring announced a new substantive rule, they reached
opposite conclusions. The Supreme Court cited Bousley for the proposition that a
rule is substantive if it "alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the
law punishes .... In contrast, rules that regulate only the manner of determining
the defendant's culpability are procedural."'0 3  The Court recognized that "[a]
decision that modifies the elements of an offense is normally substantive rather than
procedural,"'°4 but rejected Summerlin' s argument that Ring "modified the elements
of the offense for which he was convicted."' 5 In concluding that Ring was a
procedural decision, the Court made the following distinction between substantive
and procedural holdings:
This Court's holding that, because Arizona has made a certain
fact essential to the death penalty, that fact must be found by a
jury, is not the same as this Court's making a certain fact
essential to the death penalty. The former was a procedural
holding; the latter would be substantive."°
Conversely, in response to the Teague threshold question, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that "Ring is, as to Arizona, a 'substantive' decision, even if its form is
partially procedural."' 7 This conclusion is buttressed by the Supreme Court's
logic in Bousley v. United States,'°8 and subsequent interpretations of the rule it
99 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1099 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620
(1998)).
"o Id. Moreover, "[ulnlike strictly procedural rules, 'new rules of substantive criminal law
are presumptively retroactive."' Id. (citing Santana-Madera, 260 F.3d at 138).
1"1 Id. at 1100 (citing Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620).
102 523 U.S. 614 (1998).
.03 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2523 (2004) (citing Bousley, 523 U.S. at
620-21).
'04 Id. at 2524.
105 Id.
106 Id.
07 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1102.
log 523 U.S. 614 (1998).
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announced in Richardson v. United States.'° In Bousley, the Supreme Court
"reject[ed] the government's Teague-based non-retroactivity argument because the
case called for a construction of a federal statute. Teague, Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained, 'is inapplicable to the situation in which this Court decides the meaning
of a criminal statute enacted by Congress.""'" Using the same logic, the Ninth
Circuit declined to apply the Teague analysis to the rule announced in Richardson,
observing that its requirement of "jury unanimity on individual violations alleged
as part of a continuing criminal enterprise, is substantive, not procedural, under
Teague.'. Similarly, the court observed, Ring "'decide[d] the meaning of a
criminal statute,' and it did so in a manner that both redefined the separate
substantive offense of 'capital murder' in Arizona and reinserted the distinction
between murder and capital murder into Arizona's substantive criminal law
structure."" 2 Furthermore, "[w]hen a decision affects the substantive elements of
an offense, or how an offense is defined, it is necessarily a decision of substantive
law."" 3 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the rule announced by the
Supreme Court in Ring, with its restructuring of Arizona murder law and its
redefinition of the separate crime of capital murder, is necessarily a substantive
rule."1 14
In reaching the conclusion that Ring announced a substantive rule for Teague
purposes, the Ninth Circuit was careful to distinguish Apprendi v. New Jersey."5
Reconciling Ring's application in Surnmerlin with Apprendi is important because
Ring has been interpreted to be an extension of Apprendi to the capital sentencing
context;6 accordingly, it has been argued, any application of Ring should
necessarily conform to the logic of Apprendi."7 The significance for the Teague
'09 526 U.S. 813 (1999).
"o Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1100 (citing Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620).
.. Id. (citing United States v. Montalvo, 331 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003)). Furthermore, the
Summerlin majority observed that "[aill of [its] sister circuits that have considered the
question agree with this categorization." Id. (citing United States v. Barajas-Diaz, 313 F.3d
1242, 1245 (10th Cir. 2002); Ross v. United States, 289 F.3d 677,681 (11 th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1113 (2003); Santana-Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d 133, 138-39 (2d
Cir. 2001); United States v. Lopez, 248 F.3d 427, 431-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
898 (2001); Lanier v. United States, 220 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2000); Muff v. United
States, 200 F.3d 895, 905-06 (6th Cir. 2000)).
12 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1106 (citing Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620).
I' ld. (citing United States v. Dashney, 52 F.3d 298, 299 (10th Cir. 1995)).
"I Id. at 1108 (quotation omitted).
115 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
116 See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1125 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting). See also Stevenson,
supra note 20, at 1109 ("Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in Ring is framed as simply
a straightforward application of the rule of Apprendi to the Arizona death penalty statute.").
"' Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1125 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting). This premise forms the basis
of the dissent's argument against interpreting Ring as establishing a new substantive rule:
"[iun my view, the majority opinion wanders afield in the first instance by holding that Ring
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analysis is that the Apprendi majority was clear that its decision was one of
procedure, not substance:""8 "[t]he substantive basis for New Jersey's enhancement
is thus not at issue; the adequacy of New Jersey's procedure is." 9 The Ninth
Circuit distinguished Ring from Apprendi by observing that, in contrast to Apprendi,
"the substantive basis for Arizona's capital sentencing scheme was precisely at issue
in Ring."'12
2. The New Rule Announced by Ring Falls Within an Exception to the Teague
Presumption Against Non-Retroactivity.
While primarily arguing that the Teague analysis did not apply to Summerlin's
petition because Ring announced a substantive rule as opposed to one of criminal
procedure, the Ninth Circuit also performed a Teague analysis of the procedural
aspects of Ring.'2 ' The court concluded that Teague "provides an independent basis
upon which to apply Ring retroactively to cases on collateral review.' ' 2 After the
substantive-procedural threshold inquiry, the Teague analysis required determining
the date on which Summerlin's conviction became final, which was in 1984.123
Next, to determine whether Ring announced a "new rule" within the meaning of
Teague, the court "'survey[ed] the legal landscape' as it existed in 1984 to determine
whether the result in Ring was dictated by then existing precedent."' 24 Finding that
the result was not dictated, the Ninth Circuit observed that there was "no doubt that
contains a new substantive rule despite the teaching of Apprendi v. New Jersey, upon which
the Supreme Court expressly relied in deciding Ring." Id. (citation omitted).
.. At least the Summerlin majority interpreted Apprendi as clearly announcing a
procedural rule, as opposed to one of substance. Other commentators, however, have
concluded that, as applied, Apprendi may have the effect of a new rule of substantive
criminal law, thus making it even more clear that a Teague analysis is not required to decide
its retroactive effect. See infra Part III.
19 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475.
20 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1101. The Summerlin majority squarely addressed Judge
Rawlinson's dissent, remarking that "the very focus of the Supreme Court's analysis in the
two cases proves Ring and Apprendi distinct: Apprendi expressly refused to reach '[t]he
substantive basis' of law at issue in that case; Ring, conversely, did reach the relevant
substantive basis." Id. at 1102 n.9 (citation omitted).
121 Id. at 1108-21. The Summerlin majority acknowledged that "Ring's rule is partially
procedural under Teague." Id. at 1107. Because Teague only applies to new rules of criminal
procedure, id. at 1099, this concession was necessary to perform a Teague analysis; however,
the majority maintained its objection to the notion that "Ring's rule is entirely procedural,"
id. at 1107.
122 Id. at 1108.
123 Id. (Summerlin's conviction was final when "the Arizona Supreme Court denied
rehearing of its opinion affirming his conviction and death sentence.., and Summerlin did
not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.").
124 id.
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Ring announced a new rule as that term is construed for Teague purposes."
125
Because Ring announced a new, partially procedural rule after Summerlin's
conviction was final, the Teague presumption against retroactivity applied.
126
After determining that Teague's presumption applied, the court evaluated
whether the rule announced by Ring fell into either of its exceptions. The first
exception, which applies where the new rule "places 'certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
to proscribe,""'12 7 did not apply to Summerlin's petition.'28 The second exception,
however, allowed for retroactive application of a new rule "if it requires the
observance of 'those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,"' and arguably describes the effect of Ring with respect to Summerlin and
other similarly-situated federal habeas petitioners.'29 To fall within this exception,
"a new rule must: (1) seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceeding and (2) alter
our understanding of bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the
proceeding.'
130
With respect to the first of these two requirements, the Ninth Circuit pointed to
several characteristics of the invalidated Arizona capital sentencing scheme that
indicate enhanced accuracy of capital sentencing proceedings in the wake of
changes mandated by Ring. First, it observed that the "[r]eformation of capital
sentencing procedures has been presumed to meet the first requirement that the new
rule substantially enhance the accuracy of the legal proceeding at issue."'' Second,
the majority observed that the absence of procedural protections afforded during a
jury trial compromised the accuracy of judges' fact-finding during the sentencing
phase of capital trials. 3 2 Third, Ring's requirement that juries determine the
1I5 Id. at 1109.
126 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1108-09.
127 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
128 The Ninth Circuit uses two sentences to dismiss the notion that Ring fell within the
first Teague exception; the Supreme Court, on the other hand, devoted nearly two pages to
explaining why Ring did not fall within the first Teague exception, though it did so as part
of its inquiry into whether Teague applied at all. See supra note 99.
129 Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693) (quotations omitted).
130 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1109.
'I' Id. at 1110 (citing Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 243 (1990)).
132 The Ninth Circuit attributed the compromised accuracy to several practices generally
followed by Arizona judges when contemplating death sentences under the invalidated
scheme. In contrast with the guilt phase of trial, "penalty-phase presentations to Arizona
judges [were] capableof being extremely truncated affairs with heavy reliance on presentence
reports and sentencing memoranda, and with formal court proceedings frequently limited to
a brief argument by counsel." Id. Additionally, "because penalty-phase presentations to
judges tend to resemble non-capital sentencing proceedings, the sentencing judge receives
an inordinate amount of inadmissible evidence, which he or she is expected to ignore." Id.
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presence of aggravating circumstances corrected the defect under Arizona's
invalidated sentencing scheme that deprived capital defendants of the "accuracy-
enhancing role of a jury .. . to make the important moral decisions inherent in
rendering a capital verdict."'' 33 Fourth, the Ninth Circuit observed that "unlike
judges, juries do not stand for election in Arizona and therefore are less apt to be
influenced by external considerations when making their decisions.' 34 All of these
considerations, coupled with the "heightened attention that the Eighth Amendment
obligates [the court] to afford capital cases,"' 135 led the Ninth Circuit to the following
conclusion:
If the allegations concerning Judge Marquardt are true,
Summerlin's fate was determined by a drug-impaired judge,
habituated to treating penalty-phase trials the same as non-
at 1111. A review of such practices led the court of appeals to the following conclusion:
A review of the cases demonstrates that judge [sic] capital sentencing
proceedings have been contaminated by a large volume of inadmissible
evidence and marked by truncated presentations by the parties. We
have presumed that the sentencing judge could sort out the truly
relevant, admissible evidence from this morass. The relevant question
is not whether judges have been able to do so, but whether subjecting
penalty-phase evidence to the crucible of a formal trial by jury would
reduce the risk of error.
There is little doubt that it would.
Id. at 1113.
' Id. Judge Marquardt's determination that Warren Sumnerlin committed murder "in
an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner," id. at 1114 (citing ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13
703(F)(6)), was the sort of assessment that "directly measure[s] a defendant's moral guilt and
overall culpability - traditionally the jury's domain of decision," id. at 1114 (quoting
Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 1988)). The Ninth Circuit expressed
concern that a judge's ability to make such assessments "may be influenced by the possible
acclimation of the judge to the capital sentencing process." Id. at 1114. Their concern
particularly resonates given the peculiar facts surrounding Summerlin's conviction:
A reasonable inference from the habituation brought about by imposing
capital punishment under near rote conditions is that a judge may be
less likely to reflect the current conscience of the community and more
likely to consider imposing a death penalty as just another criminal
sentence. Indeed, when questioned about another capital case in which
his judgment was being assailed because he purportedly slept through
portions of the short penalty-phase hearing, Judge Marquardt answered
that he was unable to recall the case, but "said he had no doubt that the
death penalty was warranted." . . . "These guys have sentenced
themselves," he is reported to have said.
Id. (citing Liptak, supra note 93).
114 Id. at 1115.
135 Id. atl 116.
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capital sentencing, who relied upon inadmissible evidence in
making the factual findings that sentenced Summerlin to death.
Although no system is perfect, relying on a jury to administer
capital punishment unquestionably reduces the risk of error by
reposing trust in twelve individuals who must agree as to the
presence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt,
whose continued job security is not threatened by their decision,
and whose consideration is based solely on admissible evidence
subject to the rigors of cross-examination.
... [T]he inevitable conclusion must be that a requirement
of capital findings made by a jury will improve the accuracy of
Arizona capital murder trials.' 36
The court next turned to the second requirement that the rule announced in Ring
"must be a 'watershed rule' that alters our understanding of bedrock procedural
elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding."' 37 The majority identified
"the bedrock procedural element at issue [in Ring, as] the provision of the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial."' 38  More specifically, "Ring established the
bedrock principle that, under the Sixth Amendment, a jury verdict is required on
the finding of aggravated circumstances necessary to the imposition of the death
penalty."' 39 However, to fall within the "small core" of "groundbreaking" rules
described by the Supreme Court,"4 ' "[tihe newly announced rule must enhance
accuracy, improve fairness, and dictate 'observance of those procedures that... are
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""
14 1
The Ninth Circuit identified several characteristics of the Ring decision that
militate in favor of including it in the "watershed rule" category.'4 2 First, Ring
corrected a structural error -the absence of a jury- that prevented the imposition
of capital punishment from ever being "fundamentally fair."' 43 Second, because
there is no jury finding of the aggravating factors required for imposition of
136 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1115-16.
137 Id. at 1116 (citing Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)).
138 Id.
139 id.
140 Id. at 1119 (citing, e.g., O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997); Caspari v.
Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396 (1994); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,478 (1993)).
141 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
142 Id. at 1116 (citing Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242).
14 Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986) (citation omitted from
original) ("If structural error is present, 'a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function
as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be
regarded as fundamentally fair.')).
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capital punishment in pre-Ring cases, a Ring error is not subject to harmless-error
analysis. 144 Third, the majority analogized Ring to the Mills/McKoy rule that "struck
down state procedures that limited any given juror's consideration of mitigating
circumstances in capital sentencing to such evidence that the entire jury had found
relevant."' 45 Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals declared the
Mills/McKoy rule to be a "'watershed rule' that warrants retroactive application"
under Teague.' In addition, the court pointed to the broad impact of Ring,
observing that "the rule in Ring is central to the conduct of every capital murder
trial," as an indication of Ring's "watershed" significance.'47
Satisfied that the rule announced by Ring both "seriously enhance[d] the
accuracy"'4 8 of capital sentencing proceedings, and "alter[ed] our understanding of
bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding[s],"' 49 the
Ninth Circuit held that Ring satisfied the criteria of the second Teague exception.150
The court summarized its Teague analysis with the following observations: "Thus,
the rule announced in Ring defines structural safeguards implicit in our concept of
ordered liberty that are necessary to protect the fundamental fairness of capital
murder trials. Ring satisfies the criteria of Teague and must be given retroactive
effect on habeas review."' 15 ' Because this conclusion was not in accord with those
reached by other courts, the section that follows describes the resulting circuit split.
C. The Circuit Split: Comparison of Reasoning in Turner v. Crosby and Cannon
v. Mullin to Summerlin v. Stewart
In granting certiorari in the Summerlin case, the Supreme Court sought to clear
the confusion created by the Ninth Circuit's decision to retroactively apply the new
constitutional rule announced by Ring. While acknowledging that it was the first
United States circuit court of appeals to reach such a result, the Ninth Circuit was
144 Id. at 1116-19.
" Id. at 1120 n.21 (citing McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)).
146 Id. The Ninth Circuit also compared Ring to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
the landmark Supreme Court case "which declared that death penalty statutes vesting
complete discretion in the judge or in the jury, like Arizona's, were unconstitutional." Id. at
1119. Furman, the majority noted, "was given full retroactive effect for the purposes of
federal habeas review." Id. at 1119-20 (citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972)).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), however, had not been decided when retroactive
application of Furman was at issue, and therefore its retroactive application was govemed
by a different standard.
... Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1120.
148 Id. at 1109.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 1121.
151 Id.
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careful to distinguish the most notable of the seemingly contradictory circuit court
opinions: the Eleventh Circuit opinion in Turner v. Crosby and the Tenth Circuit
opinion in Cannon v. Mullin.5 '
The Eleventh Circuit recently concluded that Ring did not apply retroactively
to the petitioner in Turner v. Crosby.'53 Pursuant to Florida's advisory capital
sentencing scheme, William Thaddeus Turner was sentenced to death by a judge
after the same jury that decided his guilt recommended the death penalty.'54 The
judge had discretion to accept or reject the jury's recommendation, and in Turner's
case he adopted the recommended death sentence. 55 Although the sentencing
procedure invalidated by Ring did not involve the jury in even an advisory capacity,
"Turner argue[d] that Ring and Florida's capital sentencing procedure are irrec-
oncilable and that his judge-imposed death sentence violates his right to a jury trial
under the Sixth Amendment.' 5 6  While primarily holding that Turner was
procedurally barred from raising the Ring claim for the first time in his federal
habeas petition and thus declining to reach the merits of the claim, the Eleventh
Circuit also concluded that Ring did not apply retroactively to Turner. '
In declining to retroactively apply Ring to Turner's habeas petition, the Eleventh
Circuit first observed that two state supreme courts, Arizona and Nevada, had
already rejected Teague-based arguments for retroactive application of Ring on
collateral review. 5 8 Second, because the Eleventh Circuit had already concluded
that Apprendi established a new rule of criminal procedure that did not fit within a
Teague exception, it reasoned here that "because Apprendi was a procedural rule,
it axiomatically follows that Ring is also a procedural rule."' 5 9 Like the Ninth
Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the rule announced by Ring did not fall
within the first Teague exception for rules that "decriminalize any class of conduct
or prohibit a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants."' 6 0 But unlike
the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit also "conclude[d] that Ring, like Apprendi,
'is not sufficiently fundamental to fall within Teague's second exception.""
6
'
152 Id. at 1096, 1101.
' Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247 (1 1th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2104 (2004).
154 Id. at 1265.
'51 Id. at 1267.
156 Id. at 1280.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1283 n.29 (citing State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828 (Ariz. 2003); Colwell v. State,
59 P.3d 463 (Nev. 2002)).
15' Turner, 339 F.3d at 1284, cited with approval in Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082,
1129 (9th Cir. 2003) (Rawlinson, J., dissenting).
1"6 Id. at 1285 (quoting the observations made by the court on Apprendi in McCoy v.
United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1256-57 (11 th Cir. 2001)).
181 Id. (quoting McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1257).
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Although the Ninth Circuit explicitly disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's
holding in Turner, it did not perform a detailed critique of Turner's rationale.162 The
Ninth Circuit did, however, point out one important difference in the approaches
taken by the two courts: the Eleventh Circuit failed to address the possibility that
Ring may have announced a new substantive rule, which would thereby make the
Teague analysis moot. 163 In contrast, characterizing the new rule in Ring as
substantive was the Ninth Circuit's primary rationale for allowing its retroactive
application. "6
In accord with the Eleventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit held in Cannon v. Mullin
that Ring did not apply retroactively to federal habeas petitioners. 165  Cannon,
however, involved an application for permission to file a second habeas petition and
was accordingly decided based on the more restrictive Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) retroactivity rule,' 66 not the Teague analysis that
governed Summerlin. 167 Because different retroactivity rules applied in Cannon and
Summerlin, the Ninth Circuit holding in Summerlin did not directly contradict the
Tenth Circuit holding in Cannon; indeed, the Tenth Circuit never reached the
question of whether the new rule announced in Ring would be retroactively
available under a Teague analysis. 168 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit expressly
162 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1101 n.8.
163 id. at 1102.
'64 id. at 1099-1102. In response to "the threshold Teague question, namely whether Ring
announced a substantive rule or a procedural rule," id. at 1099, the Summerlin majority
determined that "Ring is, as to Arizona, a 'substantive' decision," id. at 1102.
165 297 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2002).
166 Enacted in 1996, "AEDPA greatly restricts the power of federal courts to award relief
to state prisoners who file second or successive habeas corpus applications." Tyler v. Cain,
533 U.S. 656, 661 (2001) (declining to allow successive habeas petition seeking the benefit
of a new rule that was not made retroactive by the Supreme Court). See generally HERTZ &
LIEBMAN, supra note 57, at § 3.2 (providing an overview of AEDPA). AEDPA requires
dismissal of a successive habeas petition if it includes a claim that was not presented in a
prior petition unless "the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional
law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). The AEDPA retroactivity rule is more likely than
the Teague rule to bar retroactive application of new constitutional rules because "the
requirement [in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)] is satisfied only if [the Supreme Court] has held
that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." Tyler, 533 U.S.
at 662.
167 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1092. The court explained that "[b]ecause [Summerlin's]
appeal was filed after the effective date of [AEDPA], the right to appeal in this case is
governed by AEDPA rules. However, because the petition for habeas corpus was filed before
AEDPA's effective date, pre-AEDPA law governs the petition itself." Id. (citations omitted).
68 Because the question of retroactive application of Ring was decided under the AEDPA
standard requiring a Supreme Court holding to make a new rule of constitutional law
retroactive, the Tenth Circuit observed that "the mere fact a new rule might fall within the
general parameters of overarching retroactivity principles established by the Supreme Court
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distinguished the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Cannon:
The question of whether a rule has retroactive application under
AEDPA is a different inquiry from the question of whether
Teague precludes retroactive application of a rule. Most
importantly, AEDPA precludes retroactive application of a new
rule of constitutional law unless "made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court." Because the Supreme
Court has not addressed whether Ring should be applied
retroactively, the analysis of the retroactively [sic] of Ring under
AEDPA and Teague is necessarily distinct.... [Iln analyzing
whether Ring should be applied retroactively in a case governed
by AEDPA, "[a]bsent an express pronouncement on retroactivity
from the Supreme Court, the rule from Ring is not
retroactive.""'
Thus, even though the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Ring should be applied
retroactively diverged from the results of both the Tenth and Eleventh Circuit
cases, the only true circuit split that the Supreme Court had to resolve was the
differing applications of the Teague retroactivity analysis by the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits. 7 ° As Part IR explains, there were persuasive arguments for the Supreme
Court to affirm the Ninth Circuit's holding under either of the alternative
justifications provided in Summerlin v. Stewart.
HI. BEYOND THE REASONING OF SUMMERLIN V. STEWART: ADDITIONAL
ARGUMENTS FOR RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF RING
As described above in Part I.B, the Ninth Circuit provided two sound justifi-
cations for concluding that Warren Summerlin's habeas petition should be decided
in his favor because of the new constitutional rule announced by Ring: (1) that the
new rule announced in Ring is substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore
exempt from the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane; and (2) even if evaluated
pursuant to Teague v. Lane, Ring applies retroactively to cases on collateral review
under Teague's exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that alter
(i.e., Teague) is not sufficient." Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989,993 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing
Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663).
69 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1096 n.4 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), and Moore v.
Kinney, 320 F.3d 767, 771 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003), respectively).
170 Id. (Although other circuits have addressed retroactive application of Ring under
AEDPA, "only the Eleventh Circuit has addressed the retroactivity of Ring under a Teague
analysis.").
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bedrock procedural principles and seriously enhance the accuracy of the
proceedings. 7' These alternative arguments for the result in Summerlin v. Stewart
are the exact issues on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Because of the
cogent rationale presented in the Ninth Circuit opinion and for the additional reasons
that follow, the Supreme Court should have affirmed the Ninth Circuit on both lines
of reasoning.
With respect to the primary holding, the Ninth Circuit is not alone in interpreting
Ring as announcing "a new rule of substantive criminal law,"' 72 and thereby exempt
from Teague analysis. Other commentators have identified an argument for finding
that Ring announced a new substantive rule that was implicitly rejected by the
Ninth Circuit: 7 3 that as an extension of Apprendi, Ring announced a substantive
rule, not despite the absence of a substantive rule in Apprendi, but because Apprendi
was also a substantive decision. 74 Indeed, some commentators have observed that
"[t]he basis for classifying Apprendi as a substantive rule is more compelling in the
wake of the Court's recent Ring decision."'
' 75
Support in the Ring decision for the proposition that Apprendi announced a
substantive rule of criminal law lies in the logic of the opinion itself. First, Ring
characterized Apprendi as recognizing that when the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial attaches to the proceedings against a defendant, he has the right to "a jury
determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is
charged, beyond a reasonable doubt";' 7 6 and furthermore, that this "right attached,
not only to Apprendi's weapons offense but also to the 'hate crime' aggravating
'7' Id. at 1109.
'7 Stevenson, supra note 20, at 1095 n.26 (citing McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245,
1271-72 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (Barkett, J., concurring in result) ("As long as a petitioner's claim
relies on Apprendi's effect on substantive law .... the claim is not analyzed under Teague,"
because new substantive rules are retroactive on collateral review.), cert. denied, 536 U.S.
906 (2002)).
' Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1102 n.9. The Ninth Circuit conceded that Apprendi did not
create a substantive rule when it distinguished Ring from Apprendi:
[T]he very focus of the Supreme Court's analysis in the two cases
proves Ring and Apprendi distinct: Apprendi expressly refused to reach
"[t]he substantive basis" of law at issue in that case; Ring, conversely,
did reach the relevant substantive basis .... [C]onsideration of the
"substantive basis" of the law was wholly absent from the Supreme
Court's analysis and decision in Apprendi.
Id. (citations omitted).
' Stevenson, supra note 20, at 1095 n.26 (2003) (citing United States v. Clark, 260 F.3d
382, 388 (5th Cir. 2001) (Parker, J., dissenting) ("Because... Apprendi announces a new
substantive rule, Teague's prohibition against retroactivity does not apply and Apprendi must
be applied retroactively.")).
"' HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 57, at § 25.1, at 103 (4th ed. Supp. 2002).
176 Ring, 536 U.S. at 602 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477).
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circumstance."'' 1 7 Ring observed that the Apprendi Court emphasized its inquiry as
"one not of form, but of effect,"' 7 8 thus recognizing that Arizona's classification of
the hate crime aggravator as a sentencing factor did not make it anything less than
an element of an aggravated crime that had to be submitted to a jury and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. 179 Additionally, the Ring Court pointed out, Arizona's
attempt to craft a sentencing scheme that would satisfy the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, is in no way exempt from the mandates of the Sixth
Amendment.1 80 To illustrate, the Ring Court made the following observation:
In various settings, we have interpreted the Constitution to
require the addition of an element or elements to the definition
of a criminal offense in order to narrow its scope. . . .If a
legislature responded to one of these decisions by adding the
element we held constitutionally required, surely the Sixth
Amendment guarantee would apply to that element. We see no
reason to differentiate capital crimes from all others in this
regard. 181
The "various settings" cited by the Supreme Court are all instances where it
mandated changes to substantive criminal laws; 82 therefore, the obvious inference
is that the changes Arizona was required to make in the wake of Apprendi, while
remaining within the confines of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, resulted in
changes to substantive criminal law. Thus, as an extension of Apprendi, Ring must
have also effected a change in substantive criminal law.
There is also support for the Ninth Circuit's alternative holding - that Ring
should be retroactively applied as an exception to Teague - beyond the reasoning
in the Summerlin v. Stewart opinion.' 83 Admittedly, "[tihe second [Teague]
exception is narrow, probably encompassing only a handful of rulings, at least
outside the 8th Amendment area, that have been rendered since Earl Warren left the
17' Id. at 602.
171 Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494).
179 ld.
180 Id. at 606 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 539 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
181 Ring, 536 U.S. at 606-07 (citations omitted).
182 Id.. The Court specifically pointed to the required addition of elements to criminal
offenses at issue in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969); and Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). Id.
'83 E.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (characterizing majority's
ruling as a"watershed change in constitutional law"); Stevenson, supra note 20, at 1095 n.26
(citing Ring, 536 U.S. 610 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasizing "fundamental" nature of "the
jury trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment... that all facts essential to imposition of the
level of punishment that the defendant receives . . . must be found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt")).
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bench."'84 Indeed, in one dissent, Justice Stevens observed that "[s]ince Teague was
decided, this Court has never found a rule so essential to the fairness of a proceeding
that it would fall under this exception."' 85
Although it would have broken new ground in retroactivity jurisprudence for the
Supreme Court to mandate retroactive application of a new rule because it fell
within the second Teague exception, there have been several influential dissents
and lower court opinions that advocated lifting the Teague bar because a new rule
fell within its second exception. Two such opinions were identified by the Ninth
Circuit."8 6 In addition, the persuasive dissent in O'Dell v. Netherland, authored
by Justice Stevens and joined by three other Justices, 8 7 counseled in favor of
recognizing that the Simmons rule fell within the second Teague exception:'
Although Teague v. Lane focused on the accuracy of a guilt-
innocence determination, we have long recognized that
sentencing procedures, as well as trials, must satisfy the dictates
of the Due Process Clause and that the unique character of the
death penalty mandates special scrutiny of those procedures in
capital cases. An unfair procedure that seriously diminishes the
likelihood of an accurate determination that a convicted
defendant should receive the death penalty rather than life
without parole . . . is plainly encompassed by Teague's
exception."8 9
The Stevens dissent concluded by remarking that the Simmons rule was "of such
importance to the accuracy and fairness of a capital sentencing proceeding that it
should be applied consistently to all prisoners whose death sentences were imposed
in violation of the rule, whether they were sentenced before Simmons was decided
or after."' 90 The Ninth Circuit's alternative holding is consistent with Justice
Stevens's conclusion; and if three Justices agreed with his logic in 1997, it certainly
would not have been an illogical extension of retroactivity law for the Supreme
Court to recognize in 2004 that Ring falls within Teague's second exception.
'84 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 57, at § 25.7, at 1121 (citations omitted).
185 O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 171 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'" See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
87 O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 168-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 170-73 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).The new constitutional rule of criminal procedure
announced by Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), was that a defendant facing
the death penalty has the right to rebut a prosecutor's argument of future dangerousness by
pointing out that if sentenced to imprisonment he would not be eligible for parole. Id.
'89 Id. at 171 n.3 (citations omitted).
"9 Id. at 173 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Perhaps the most persuasive argument for affirming the Ninth Circuit rationale,
beautifully articulated by Judge Reinhardt, is also the most simple. In his Summerlin
concurrence, Judge Reinhardt did not attempt to "improve on the legal arguments"'91
offered by the majority opinion, but instead wrote separately "only to emphasize that
a contrary result would be unthinkable in a society that considers itself both decent
and rational."' 92 While the lengthy explication of retroactivity jurisprudence is a
necessary part of the Summerlin opinion, Reinhardt boiled down the question in
Summerlin to chilling simplicity:
[M]ay the state now deliberately execute persons knowing that
their death sentences were arrived at in a manner that violated
their constitutional rights? Is it possible that prisoners will now
be executed by the state solely because of the happenstance that
the Supreme Court recognized the correctness of their
constitutional arguments too late - on a wholly arbitrary date,
rather than when it should have? Will we add to all of the other
arbitrariness infecting our administration of the death penalty the
pure fortuity of when the Supreme Court recognized its own
critical error with respect to the meaning of the Constitution?
Can we justify executing those whose legal efforts had reached
a certain point in our imperfect legal process on the day the
Supreme Court changed its mind, while invalidating the death
sentences of those whose cases were waiting slightly further
down the line? 93
Judge Reinhardt observed that "[iut should not take a constitutional scholar to
comprehend [the] point" that states should not be permitted to execute prisoners
who were unconstitutionally sentenced simply because of the arbitrary date on
which their appeals were finalized."9 But given that there are valid constitutional
arguments for affirming both of the Ninth Circuit's alternative Summerlin
holdings,"'5 Reinhardt's observations should have resolved any doubts in favor of
affirming the Ninth Circuit. Because his concerns particularly resonate in light of
the facts surrounding Summerlin's conviction and sentencing, the Supreme Court
should have taken this opportunity to extend the benefit of Ring to all federal habeas
petitioners.
'9' Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1122 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
192 id.
193 Id. at 1124-25.
4 Id. at 1125.
195 Supra Part 11.B.
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IV. CONCLUSION
When the United States Supreme Court issued its seminal decision in Ring v.
Arizona requiring that juries determine the presence or absence of aggravating and
mitigating factors that lead to imposition of the death penalty, it vindicated the Sixth
Amendment rights of capital defendants who were unconstitutionally sentenced
without jury findings on those factors.196 Unfortunately for Warren Summerlin and
eighty-eight other death row inmates, the Supreme Court limited its vindication of
the jury trial right to those inmates whose sentences were not yet final when it
decided Ring. As the foregoing analysis shows, the Supreme Court could have used
the logical framework provided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit to arrive at a just result while remaining within the confines of evolving
retroactivity jurisprudence by affirming either of Summerlin v. Stewart's alternative
holdings.
The Supreme Court should have affirmed the Ninth Circuit's primary holding
that the new rule announced in Ring is substantive, and therefore exempt from
Teague v. Lane's presumption against retroactivity.197 While there are substantive
and procedural components to the Ring decision, precedent supports classifying
Ring as substantive for purposes of retroactivity analysis.'98 In the alternative, the
Supreme Court should have affirmed the Ninth Circuit's secondary holding that
Ring applies retroactively to cases on collateral review under Teague's exception for
"watershed rules of criminal procedure that alter bedrock procedural principles
and seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceedings."' 99 The Ninth Circuit
cogently reasoned that the rule announced in Ring satisfied the Teague requirements
that it "(1) seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceeding and (2) alter our
understanding of bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the
proceeding."2 ° Under either rationale, the Supreme Court should have concluded
that the Ninth Circuit correctly applied retroactivity jurisprudence when it applied
Ring to Summerlin's habeas petition.
Finally, in weighing its decision, the Supreme Court should have placed more
emphasis on the bizarre circumstances of Warren Summerlin's conviction and
sentence, which inspired the Ninth Circuit to quote Mark Twain: "truth is often
stranger than fiction because fiction has to make sense." '' Indeed, allowing a
potentially drug-impaired judge to impose a death sentence without the input of a
196 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
'9' See supra Part II.B.1.
'98 See supra Part II.B.1.
'9' Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Summerlin (No. 03-526) (citations omitted). See
supra Part I.B.2.
200 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1109.
201 Id. at 1084.
304 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 13:275
jury does not seem fair or sensible. Because the Supreme Court recognized that the
procedure by which Warren Summerlin was sentenced to death is unconstitutional,
carrying out his execution without at least affording him a new sentencing hearing
will add. a final, unbelievable twist to the story of Warren Summerlin's journey
through the legal system. The Ninth Circuit's opinion provided sound legal
reasoning for curing the injustice perpetrated upon him: it was incumbent upon the
nine Justices to affirm the Ninth Circuit and allow Warren Summerlin and other
habeas petitioners the Sixth Amendment right to a jury that they were previously
wrongfully denied. The result the Supreme Court reached instead simply does not
make sense.
